I examine the implementation of emission policy in a union of countries. Production in any country incurs emissions that pollute all over the union, but efficiency in production can be improved by research and development (R&D). I compare four cases: laissez-faire, Pareto optimal policy, lobbying with centrally-determined emission quotas and lobbying with emission trade. The main findings are as follows. With emission quotas, the growth rate is socially optimal, but welfare sub-optimal. Emission trade speeds up growth from the initial position of laissez-faire, but slows down from the initial position of centrally-determined emission quotas.
Introduction
In this study, I examine the implementation of emission policy in a union of countries. The production of goods in any country incurs emissions that pollute all over the union, but efficiency in production in each country can be improved by research and development which has a random outcome. In every country, there is a local planner that maximizes welfare and has enough instrument to control the allocation of resources in the country. In the union, there are common environmental regulations that compel local planners to spend some of their resources to pollution abatement.
In particular, I examine the following cases of exercising emission policy:
(i) Laissez-faire. All countries choose their optimal emissions ignoring the externality through pollution.
(ii) Pareto optimum. In the union, there is a benevolent central planner that sets emission quotas for all member and is able to transfer resources between countries.
(iii) Lobbying without emission trade. In the union, there is a self-interested central planner that sets emission quotas for all countries. That planner is subject to lobbying and has no financial resources of its own.
(iv) Lobbying with emission trade. In the union, there is a self-interested central planner that sets emission quotas for all countries, and a market through which the countries can sell their quotas to each others. The central planner is subject to lobbying and has no financial resources.
In this model, there are two sources of inefficiency. One is negative externality through pollution, for which a single country has too much production with emissions and too little investment in R&D. The second externality is waste due to lobbying. Given that the central planner consists at least partly of different households than the rest of the population, political contributions are waste from the viewpoint of the latter. The relative weight of these sources determine the outcome of the comparison between cases (i)-(iv).
The impact of any environmental policy depends crucially on the existence of uncertainty. The papers Corsetti (1997) , Smith (1996) , Turnovsky (1995 Turnovsky ( ,1999 consider public policy by a growth model where productivity shocks follows a Wiener process. Soretz (2003) applies that approach to environmental policy. In one of my earlier publications (Palokangas 2008) , I examine an economic union where member countries produce emissions in fixed proportion to labor in production and where uncertainty is embodied in technological change in the form of Poisson processes. As a result of this, I obtain Pareto-optimal emission taxes for the member countries. In this paper, I modify Palokangas ' (2008) model so that (i) the central planner is self-interested and (ii) labor and emissions are different inputs in production.
This paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present the general structure of the union and a single country. Sections 4, 5, 6 and 7 examine the cases (i)-(iv) above, respectively.
The union
I consider a union of fixed number n of similar countries. Each country j ∈ {1, ..., n} has a fixed labor supply L, of which the amount l j is used in production and the rest
in R&D. I assume that all countries j ∈ {1, ..., n} produce the same good, for simplicity.
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The total supply of the consumption good in the union, y, is the sum of the outputs y j of all the member countries:
Let m j be emissions in country j and P be pollution in the union. I assume that pollution is determined by total emissions in the union, n j=1 m j :
The bigger the number of countries, n, the bigger the negative externality through pollution. Fos this reason, I say that the decision making in the union is the more centralized (de-centralized ), the smaller (bigger) n. All households in the union share the same preferences and take income, prices and the interest rate r as given. Thus, they all behave as if there were a single representative household for the whole union. The household chooses its flow of consumption C to maximize its utility starting at time T ,
where θ is time and ρ > 0 the constant rate of time preference. This utility maximization leads to the Euler equation (cf. Grossman and Helpman 1994b)
where p the consumption price, E household spending and r the interest rate. The goods market is in equilibrium, if the supply y equals the demand C. Because in the model there is no money that would pin down the nominal price level at any time, it is convenient to normalize the households' total consumption expenditure in the common market, E, at unity. From y = C, E = 1, (2) and (4) it then follows that the interest rate r is constant:
The countries
Each country j consists of the production sector, which makes the consumption good, and the abatement sector, which uses resources to meet the environment regulations in the union. Because pollution P employs resources in the abatement sector, it decreases production y j . I assume that the marginal rate of substitution between production and pollution is given by
where δ > 0 is a constant. The efficiency of production in country j is a γ j , where a > 1 is a constant and γ j is the serial number of technology. In the advent of technological change in country j, this efficiency increases from a
. Noting this and (6), total output in country j is a function of labor input l j , emissions m j and the level of productivity, a γ j , as follows:
where f is a CES production function, σ the constant elasticity of substitution between labor and emissions, δ the constant elasticity of output with respect to pollution and P −δ the abatement factor. The local planner in country j (hereafter local planner j) pays political contributions R j to the central planner of the union. Real income in country j is therefore given by y j −R j , where y j is output and R j political contributions. Noting (7), I obtain local planner j's utility from an infinite stream of real income beginning at time T as follows:
where E is the expectation operator and r > 0 the interest rate [cf. (5)]. The improvement of technology in country j depends on labor devoted to R&D, z j . In a small period of time dt, the probability that R&D leads to development of a new technology is given by λz j dt, while the probability that R&D remains without success is given by 1 − λz j dt, where λ is productivity in R&D. Noting (1), this defines a Poisson process χ j with dχ j = 1 with probability
where dχ j is the increment of the process χ j . The expected growth rate of productivity a γ j in the production sector in the stationary state is given by
where E is the expectation operator (cf. Aghion and Howitt 1998), p. 59, and Wälde (1999) . In other words:
The expected growth rate g j of country j's output is in fixed proportion to labor devoted to R &D, z j = L − l j , in that country.
Given this result, I can use labor devoted to R&D, z j , as a proxy for the growth rate in each country j.
Laissez-faire
If there is laissez-faire, there is no lobbying and no political contributions either, R j = 0 for all j. Local planner j then maximizes its utility (8) by emissions m j and labor input l j subject to Poisson technological change (9), given emissions in the rest of the union,
The value of the optimal program for planner j starting at time T is then
where
This leads to the first-order conditions
To solve the dynamic program, I try the solution that the value of the program, Ω j , is in fixed proportion ϕ j > 0 to instantaneous utility:
This implies
Inserting (16) and (17) into the Bellman equation (12) and (13) yields
Inserting (16) and (17) into the first-order conditions (14) and (15) yields
Because there is symmetry throughout all countries j = 1, ..., n in the model, it is true that all countries have equal emissions m j = m in equilibrium. Inserting this into (18) and (19) and noting (1), (7) and (10) yield
Solving for m j /l j from (20) and l j from (21) yields
These results can be rephrased as follows: A higher level of centralization helps to internalize the effect of pollution.
In that case, the local planners alleviate pollution by transferring resources from production into R&D. This decreases output, but speeds up economic growth. When labor and emissions are gross complements, the decrease of labor in production decreases emissions as well. When labor and emissions are gross substitutes, labor transferred from production into R&D is partly replaced by emissions. This increases the emissions-labor ratio in production.
Pareto optimum
Assume a benevolent central planner which has enough instruments to transfer income between countries.
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Because the countries do not pay political contributions to a benevolent planner, R j = 0 for all j, and because such a planner can internalize the externality of pollution entirely, the outcome is the Pareto optimum where the union behaves as if there were one jurisdiction only, n = 1. Noting (22), labor input in production at the Pareto optimum is given by
Furthermore, proposition 2 has the following corollary:
Proposition 3 The growth rate z is the highest at the Pareto optimum.
For the remainder of this paper, I assume that the central planner is selfinterested, not benevolent. In section 6, I assume that the central planner taylors a specific emission quota m j for each country, but the countries cannot trade with these quotas. In section 7, I introduce emission trade.
Lobbying with emission quotas
Following Grossman and Helpman (1994) , I assume that the central planner of the union has its own interests and collects political contributions. Local planner j in each country j ∈ {1, ..., n} pays political contributions R j to the central planner which decides on a specific emission quota m j for each country j ∈ {1, ..., n}. The order of this common agency game is the following. First, the local planners set their political contributions (R 1 , ..., R n ) conditional on the central planner's prospective policy (m 1 , ..., m n ). Second, the central planners sets the quotas (m 1 , ..., m n ) and collect the contributions for its personal consumption. Third, the local planners maximize their utilities given the level of political contributions (R 1 , ..., R n ). This game is solved in reversed order as follows. Subsection 6.1 considers a local planner, subsection 6.2 the central planner and subsection 6.3 the political equilibrium.
The local planners
Local planner j maximizes its utility (8) by labor input l j subject to Poisson technological change (9) on the assumption that the interest rate r, the quotas m 1 , ..., m n , pollution P = j m j [cf. (3)] and and its political contributions R j are kept constant. It is equivalent to maximize
dt by l j subject to (9), given r, m j , P and R j . The value of the optimal program for local planner j starting at time T can then be defined as follows:
The Bellman equation corresponding to the optimal program (24) is
This leads to the first-order condition ∂Ψ
To solve the dynamic program, I try the solution that the value of the program, Γ j , is in fixed proportion ϑ j > 0 to instantaneous utility:
Inserting (28) and (29) into the Bellman equation (25) and (26) yields
Inserting (28), (29) and (30) into the first-order conditions (27) and noting (7), one obtains
Noting (3), (7), (24) and (28), local planner j's utility (8) becomes
The self-interested central planner
The present value the expected flow of the real political contributions R j from all countries j at time T is given by
Given this, (3) and (32), I specify the central planner's utility function as:
where constants ζ j ≥ 0 are the weight of planner j's welfare in the central planner's preferences. Grossman and Helpman's (1994a) objective function (34) is widely used in models of common agency and it has been justified as follows. The politicians are mainly interested in their own income which consists of the contributions from the public, j R j , but because they must defend their position in general elections, they must sometimes take the utilities of the interest groups Υ j into account directly. The linearity of (34) in j R j is assumed, for simplicity.
The political equilibrium
Each local planner j tries to affect the central planner by its contributions R j . The contribution schedules are therefore functions of the central planner's policy variables (= the emission quotas m j ):
Following proposition 1 of Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997) , a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for this game is a set of contribution schedules R j (m 1 , ..., m n ) and a policy (m 1 , ..., m n ) such that the following conditions (i) − (iv) hold:
(i) Contributions R j are non-negative but no more than the contributor's income, Υ j ≥ 0.
( 
(iv) Local planner j provides the central planner at least with the level of utility than in the case it offers nothing (R j = 0), and the central planner responds optimally given the other local planners contribution functions,
Noting (32), the conditions (37) are equivalent to
and
Given these equations, one obtains
Noting (35) and (37), the central planner's utility function (34) becomes
Noting (38) and (63), the equilibrium conditions (36) are equivalent to the first-order conditions
The political equilibrium is now specified by the equilibrium conditions (31) for all local planners j = 1, ..., n plus those (40) for the central planner. In this system, there are 2n unknowns, (l j , m j ) for j = 1, ..., n. I assume, for simplicity, uniform initial productivity in the union, γ k = γ 1 for all k = 1. In the system, noting (28), this yields perfect symmetry l j = l, m k = m and Γ j = Γ for the countries j = 1, ..., n in equilibrium. Given this and (3), the equilibrium conditions (31) and (40) change into
The results (41) are the same as the result (20) and (21) The introduction of the central planner as a decision maker for emissions eliminates the externality through pollution. This effect is the same for both a benevolent and a self-interested central planner.
In the case of lobbying, the countries pay political contributions, R j > 0 for all j, while in the case of Pareto-optimal policy, there are no such contributions, R j = 0 for all j. If the central planner consists of different households than the rest of the population (even partly), one can define political contributions are a waste from the viewpoint of the latter. Thus, there is the following corollary for proposition 4:
Proposition 5 In the case of lobbying with given emission quotas, welfare is sub-optimal.
Lobbying with emission trade
In this section, I assume that the central planner defines a quota for each country's emissions, but the countries can trade emissions among themselves. To enable a stationary state equilibrium in the model, I assume that the quotas are in fixed proportion to the level of productivity a γ j so that more advances countries get tighter restrictions. Therefore, the quota for country j's productivity-adjusted emissions m j a γ j is given by q j . When country j has excess quotas, q j > m j a γ j , it can sell the difference q j − m j a γ j to the other members of the union at the price p. Correspondingly, when country j has excess emissions, m j a γ j − q j , it must buy the difference m j a γ j − q j from other countries at the price p. At the level of the whole union, productivityadjusted emissions n j=1 m j a γ j are equal to total quotas
Local planner j in each country j ∈ {1, ..., n} pays political contributions R j to the central planner. The order of this common agency game is the following. First, the local planners set their political contributions (R 1 , ..., R n ) conditional on the central planner's prospective policy (q 1 , ..., q n ). Second, the central planners sets the quotas (q 1 , ..., q n ) and collect the contributions for its personal consumption. Third, the local planners maximize their utilities given the level of political contributions (R 1 , ..., R n ). This game is solved in reversed order as follows. Subsection 7.1 considers a local planner, subsection 7.2 the central planner and subsection 7.3 the political equilibrium.
The local planners
Planner j's utility starting at time T , (8), can be extended into
where p(q j − m j a γ j ) is country j's net income from emission trade. Local planner j maximizes its utility (43) by labor input l j and emissions m j subject to Poisson technological change (9) on the assumption that the interest rate r, the quotas q 1 , ..., q n , the emission price p, emissions in the rest of the union, m −j , and its political contributions R j are kept constant. It is equivalent to maximize
dt by (l j , m j ) subject to (9), given r, q 1 , ..., q n , p, m −j and R j . The value of the optimal program for local planner j can then be defined as follows:
T ). The Bellman equation corresponding to the optimal program (44) is
I try the solution that the value of the program, Γ j , is given by
where ϑ j > 0 is independent of the control variables. This implies
Inserting (49) and (50) into the Bellman equation (45) and (46) yields
Given (49), (50) and (51) the first-order conditions (47) and (48) 
The self-interested central planner
In the system (10), (52) and (53) for j = 1, .., n, there are 3n equations, 3n unknown variables, l j , m j and m −j for j = 1, .., n, and the known variable p. This and the symmetry throughout j = 1, ..., n imply
Inserting this into (42) yields
where m −1 is the inverse function of m.
Noting (44), (49) and (55), Local planner j's utility (43) changes into
From the conditions (51), (52) and (53) it follows that labor input l j and emissions m j in production are constant over time for all countries j.
The local planners j = 1, ..., n lobby the central planner which decides on the emission quotas (q 1 , ..., q n ). Following Grossman and Helpman (1994) , I assume that the central planner has its own interests and collects contributions (R 1 , ..., R n ) from the local planners. Given this, I specify Grossman and Helpman's (1994) utility function for the central planner as follows:
where constants ζ j ≥ 0 is the weight of planner j's welfare.
The political equilibrium
Each local planner j tries to affect the central planner by its contributions R j . The contribution schedules are therefore functions of the central planner's policy variables, the emission quotas m j :
The central planner maximizes its utility function (57) 
Noting (56), the conditions (60) are equivalent to
which suggests that in equilibrium the change in the lobby's contribution (R j ) due to a change in quota m j is equal to the change in the lobby's rent ∆ j due to this same fact, holding the contribution R j constant. Given (1), (3), (51) and (54), it is true that m j = m, m −j = (n − 1)m, l j = l, z j = z = L − l, ϑ j = ϑ and P = nm. In the stationary state, all these variables must be kept constant over time. Given (54) and (55) (51), (54) and (61) it follows that
. (62) Noting (58) and (60), the central planner's utility function (57) becomes With emission trade, one more unit of R&D costs less in terms of lost output. Thus, emission trade boosts R&D and decreases labor in production. When labor and emissions are gross complements, a smaller labor input in production leads to smaller emissions as well. When labor and emissions are gross substitutes, labor transferred from production into R&D is partly replaced by emissions and the emissions-labor ratio increases. Finally, given (23), l is bigger and the growth rate z = N − l smaller in the case of lobbying with emission trade than in at Pareto optimum if and only if , and the elasticity of output with respect to pollution through abatement, δ, cannot be greater than one. Thus, with a large enough number of countries, n, it is true that n > 2(1 − δ) ≥ (1 − δ)/(1 − ξ) and I conclude:
This is equivalent to
Proposition 7 In the lobbying equilibrium with emission trade, the growth rate z is sub-optimal.
Because with emission trade the levels of emissions are decided at the level of countries rather than at the level of the union, the externality through pollution cannot be internalized. Consequently, the growth rate is then smaller than at the Pareto optimum.
Conclusions
A higher level of centralization decreases the level of output, but increases the growth rate, increases emissions per labor input, when labor and emissions are gross substitutes, and decreases the level of emissions unambiguously, when labor and emissions are gross complements. A higher level of centralization helps to internalize the effect of pollution. In that case, a local planner alleviates pollution by transferring resources from production into R&D. This will speed up economic growth. When labor and emissions are gross substitutes, the transfer of resources from production into R&D is partly outweighed by higher emissions so that the emissions-labor ratio in production rises. When labor and emissions are gross complements, the decrease of labor in production decreases emissions as well.
In Pareto optimum, the union of countries behaves as if there were only one jurisdiction. Given the result above, the level of output is then at the lowest, but the growth rate at the highest level in Pareto optimum. Furthermore, increases emissions per labor input are at the highest level, when labor and emissions are gross substitutes, but the level of emissions at the lowest level, when labor and emissions are gross complements in Pareto optimum.
In the case of lobbying with given emission quotas, the emissions-labor ratio, the growth rate, total consumption and pollution are the same as in the case of Pareto-optimal policy. The introduction of the central planner as a decision maker for emissions eliminates the externality through pollution. This effect is the same for both a benevolent and a self-interested central planner. On the other hand, the welfare is lower in the case of lobbying with given emission quotas than in the case of Pareto-optimal policy. In the case of lobbying, the countries pay political contributions, while in the case of Pareto-optimal policy, there are no such contributions. If the central planner consists of different households than the rest of the population (even partly), political contributions are a waste from the viewpoint of the latter.
With emission trade, one more unit of R&D costs less in terms of lost output. Thus, emission trade boosts R&D and decreases labor in production. When labor and emissions are gross complements, a smaller labor input in production leads to smaller emissions as well. When labor and emissions are gross substitutes, labor transferred from production into R&D is partly replaced by emissions and the emissions-labor ratio increases. Because with emission trade the levels of emissions are decided at the level of countries rather than at the level of the union, the externality through pollution cannot be internalized. Consequently, the growth rate is then smaller than at the Pareto optimum.
